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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
STS-43 launch, originally scheduled for July 24, 1991, was initially delayed 24 hours
due to a problem in the electrical circuit controlling Orbiter/External Tank (ET)
separation. A further launch postponement occurred the next day when channel "A" on
the Main Engine Controller (MEC) for Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) #3 went to
halt during the countdown. Data indicated that a hardware failure of the MEC had
occurred; both channels "A" and "B" must be operational prior to launch. The
malfunctioning MEC was changed out and retested, and STS-43 launch was rescheduled
for August 1, 1991. After an additional 1-day delay due to rain and thunderstorm
activity in the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch area, STS-43/Atlantis was launched
from KSC Launch Complex 39A at 11:02 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 2,
1991.
The STS-43 flight included several new or recent modifications to improve
performance and safety. This was the first mission flown with the OI-20 flight software
designed for use with the new AP-101S General Purpose Computer (GPC); O1-20
provides enhancements that improve overall safety by adding operational capability,
monitoring capability, and automation in time-critical sequences. Cadmium plating was
eliminated on the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) igniter inner and outer gasket retainers;
this eliminated the potential for cadmium-induced embrittlement of the hardware.
STS-43 was the first flight of the new tire pressure transducer that allows the ground to
more accurately determine the tire pressure leak rate. The STS-43 Gaseous Oxygen
(GOX) Flow Control Valves (FCVs) were shimmed to a fixed 78% orifice. This is the
same configuration as STS-40, the first flight with this fixed 78% orifice that will become
the final configuration for the Orbiter fleet. Performance on STS-43 was similar to the
satisfactory performance experienced on STS-40.
Atlantis carded the fourth Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-E) into orbit
to update NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), resulting in 2
operating satellites plus a complement of 2 spares in this space network. Following
TDRS deployment, Atlantis moved to a safe separation distance prior to the Inertial
Upper Stage (IUS) SRM-1 burn that placed the TDRS-E satellite into a transfer orbit.
All IUS-sequenced events associated with the transfer orbit occurred on time, and
performance was nominal. The IUS SRM-1 and SRM-2 burns, coupled with their
respective follow-on Reaction Control System (RCS) burns, were well within pre-mission
predicted limits. As a result, the IUS successfully placed TDRS-E in a 19,335.5-Nautical
Mile (NM) by 19312.9-NM geosynchronous orbit above the Pacific Ocean southwest of
Hawaii.
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Along with the TDRS-E/IUS in Atlantis' cargo bay for STS-43 were the following
payloads: the Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SSBUV) experiment, the Space
Station Heat Pipe Advanced Radiator Element-II (SHARE-H), the Optical
Communications Through the Shuttle Window (OCTW) flight demonstration, and the
Tank Pressure Control Experiment (TPCE). A number of other experiments were
carded in Atlantis' middeck.
All systems and payloads operations were generally satisfactory during the 9-day
mission. Atlantis landed at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) at 8:23 a.m. EDT for
a total mission elapsed time of 8 days, 21 hours, 21 minutes, and 25 seconds. This was
the first planned landing at KSC's SLF since return-to-flight. However, 2 other Shuttle
missions landed at KSC since return to flight; both were diverted to KSC due to bad
weather at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document that
is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission
Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space Shuttle
flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a change,
or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk factors
impacting the STS-43 flight were also documented prior to the STS-43 Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and the STS-43 Launch Minus Two-Day (L-2) Review
(L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance against safety risk
factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to the
Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-43 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and
factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for
discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a summary description of the STS-43 mission,
including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and
landing sites, and other mission- and payload-related
information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-43 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-43
fight.
Section 4 - Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-43.
Section 5 - Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (WAs) that developed
during the STS-40 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of WAs that developed during the STS-37
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter Vehicle (OV-104).
Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-43
mission. Those IFAs that are considered to represent a safety
risk will be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle
flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains presentation
data, white papers, and other documentation. These data were
used to support the resolution rationale or retention of open
status for each item discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-43 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of the STS-43 Mission
STS-43 launch, originally scheduled for July 24, 1991, was initially delayed 24 hours
due to a problem in the electrical circuit controlling Orbiter/External Tank (ET)
separation. A further launch postponement occurred the next day when channel "A" on
the Main Engine Controller (MEC) for Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) #3 went to
halt during the countdown. Data indicated that a hardware failure of the MEC had
occurred; both channels "A" and "B" must be operational prior to launch. The
malfunctioning MEC was changed out and retested, and STS-43 launch was rescheduled
for August 1, 1991. After an additional 1-day delay due to rain and thunderstorm
activity in the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch area, STS-43/Atlantis was launched
from KSC launch complex 39A at 11:02 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 2,
1991.
The STS-43 flight included several new or recent modifications to improve
performance and safety. This was the first mission flown with the OI-20 flight software
designed for use with the new AP-101S General Purpose Computer (GPC); OI-20
provides enhancements that improve overall safety by adding operational capability,
monitoring capability, and automation in time-critical sequences. Cadmium plating was
eliminated on the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) igniter inner and outer gasket retainers;
this eliminated the potential for cadmium-induced embritflement of the hardware.
STS-43 was the first flight of the new tire pressure transducer that allows the ground to
more accurately determine the tire pressure leak rate. The STS-43 Gaseous Oxygen
(GOX) Flow Control Valves (FCVs) were shimmed to a fixed 78% orifice. This is the
same configuration as STS-40, the first flight with this fixed 78% orifice that will become
the final configuration for the Orbiter fleet. Performance on STS-43 was similar to the
satisfactory performance experienced on STS-40.
During ascent, Water Spray Boiler (WSB) #2 failed to provide cooling to the
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) lube oil. The crew configured the WSB controller from
system A to B with the same results. The APU #2 gearbox forward bearing temperature
reached 351°F; Flight Rule (FR) 10-14 was invoked, and APU #2 was shut down directly
after Main Engine Cutoff (MECO). The APU gearbox is certified for 400°F. Data
indicated that freezing occurred on the water spray bar. WSB undercooling occurred on
STS-35/OV-102, STS-37/OV-104, and STS-38/OV-104. FR 10-23 indicates that an APU
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without WSB cooling has about 11 minutes of allowable run-time. In this case, the
affected APU/hydraulic system activation was delayed for entry until Terminal Area
Energy Management (TAEM). FR 10-85 states that for loss of a single WSB, the flight
will continue to a nominal End-Of-Mission (EOM) provided there is no subsequent loss
of redundancy on one of the remaining APU/hydraulic/WSB systems; if redundancy is
lost on a remaining system, Minimum Duration Flight (MDF) is invoked. On Flight Day
(FD) 1 indications were that WSB #2, that froze up during ascent, had now thawed. No
more action was planned until Flight Control System (FCS) checkout, at which time
APU #2 was to be used.
Atlantis carried the fourth Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-E) into orbit
to update NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), resulting in 2
operating satellites plus a complement of 2 spares in this space network. The TDRS-E
satellite/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) booster was deployed from the Shuttle's payload bay
approximately 6 hours and 12 minutes after launch. Following TDRS deployment,
Atlantis moved to a safe separation distance prior to the IUS SRM-1 burn that placed
the TDRS-E satellite into a transfer orbit. All IUS-sequenced events associated with the
transfer orbit occurred on time, and performance was nominal. The IUS SRM-1 and
SRM-2 burns, coupled with their respective follow-on Reaction Control System (RCS)
burns, were well within pre-mission predicted limits. As a result, the IUS successfully
placed TDRS-E in a 19,335.5 -Nautical Mile (NM) by 19312.9-NM geosynchronous orbit
above the Pacific Ocean southwest of Hawaii.
Along with the TDRS-E/1US in Atlantis' cargo bay for STS-43 were the following
payloads: the Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SSBUV) experiment, mounted in 2
Get-Away-Special (GAS) containers, which was used to aid in calibrating ultraviolet
satellites already in orbit that assist in measuring the Earth's ozone layer and provide
solar irradiance data; the Space Station Heat Pipe Advanced Radiator Element-II
(SHARE-H), a modification of the SHARE-II payload flown on STS-29, used to
demonstrate and quantify the microgravity thermal vacuum performance of a high-
capacity, space-constructible, heat pipe radiator element with no moving parts that may
be used to cool Space Station Freedom; the Optical Communications Through the
Window (OCTW) flight demonstration that uses fiber optics for data communications
onboard the Shuttle; and the Tank Pressure Control Experiment (TPCE), contained in
GAS hardware, to study the effects of mierogravity on the thermal stratification of fluids
and to determine the effectiveness of jet-induced mixing for controlling tank pressure.
In Atlantis' middeck was the Auroral Photography Experiment-B (APE-B), an Air
Force-sponsored experiment to study the Earth's auroras (Northern and Southern
Lights); the Bioserve Instrumentation Technology Associates Materials Dispersion
Apparatus (BIMDA), consisting of apparatus for conducting experiments in protein
crystal growth, zeolite crystal formation, collagen and virus assembly, interferon
induction, seed germination, cell fixation, and fluid sciences/diffusion; the Investigations
into Polymer Membrane Processing (IPMP) experiment, a test of manufacturing
polymers in orbit; the Protein Crystal Growth-III (PCG-III) experiment, a device used to
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grow crystals in microgravity; the SpaceAcceleration Measurement System(SAMS), a
deviceused to measureaccelerationsand disturbancesto weightlessnessduring Atlantis'
stay in orbit; and the Solid Surface Combustion Experiment (SSCE), a test of the way
materials burn in weightlessness.
Operation of all systems was generally satisfactory during the 9-day mission (the
inflight anomalies encountered are addressed in Section 7). FCS checkout was
performed on FD 8 using APU #2, and the failure of WSB #2 was confirmed. On
FD 9, as planned, the affected APU was started at the TAEM interface (Math 2.5) and
shut down at wheel stop. The remaining 2 APUs were run in their nominal
configuration, speed normal and auto shutdown enabled. APU #1 was started at Time
of Ignition (TIG) - 5 minutes, and APU #3 was started at Entry Interface (EI) - 13
minutes. Approximately 11 RCS thrusters exhibited lower than normal temperatures.
This was thought to have been caused by moisture trapped in the thrusters from the
rains at KSC prior to launch.
The mission's final experiments included a good test of new digital autopilot
software which will reduce the amount of thruster fuel used and the amount of jarring
caused by thruster firings. The crew executed 22 tests of this new system, which is being
considered for flight on the next Shuttle mission. Performance of both SHARE-II heat
pipes closely matched preflight predictions during both the bay-to-Earth and tail-to-Sun
data takes. A final test was also performed of the prototype space station cooling
radiators in which the two different design radiators were deliberately reprimed. As
expected, the graded grove design heat pipe was able to reprime itself, while the
monogrove design did not exhibit this capability.
Atlantis landed satisfactorily at the KSC Shuttle landing Facility (SLF) at 8:23 a.m.
EDT for a total mission elapsed time of 8 days, 21 hours, 21 minutes, and 25 seconds.
This was the first planned landing at KSC's SLF since return to flight. Two other Shuttle
missions landed at KSC since return to flight; both were diverted to Kennedy due to bad
weather at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: August 2, 1991
• Launch Time: 11:02 a.m. EDT
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39A
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility
• TAL Site: Banjul, The Gambia
• Alternate TAL Sites: Ben Guerir, Morocco; Moron, Spain
Landing Site: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 15
Landing Date: August 11, 1991
Landing Time: 8:23 a.m. EDT
Mission Duration: 8 Days, 21 Hours, 21 Minutes
Crew Size: 5
Inclination: 28.45 *
Orbit: 160 x 160 Nautical Miles/Direct Insertion
Orbiter: OV-104 (9)Atlantis
ET-47
SRBs: BI-045
RSRM Flight Set #17
MLP#1
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ENGINE #2024 #2012 #2028
POWERHEAD #2026 #2025 #4005
MCC* #2013 #2020 #2018
NOZZLE #4006 #4002 #4012
CONTROLLER F5 F16 F18
FASCOS* #01 #09 #21
HPFTP* #6102R3 #4007R3 #6009
LPFTP* #2131 #4006 #2228
HPOTP* #4009R3 #2425R 1 #2405R 1
LPOTP* #2028 #2213 #2027R 1
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Miscellaneous Items of Interest for the STS-43 Mission.
First Use of O1-20 Flight Software. STS-43 is the first mission using the
O1-20 flight software. O1-20 was designed to be used with the new General
Purpose Computers (GPCs), AP-101S. There are several enhancements
provided in O1-20 that improve overall safety by adding operational
capability, monitoring capability, and automation in time-critical sequences.
Following is a list of some of the O1-20 safety enhancements:
Provides the Orbiter crew visibility concerning the status of the Flight
Control System actuators, Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
actuators, and Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) selection/deselection
status during Operations Sequence (OPS) #1 (ascent) and OPS #6
(abort). Previously, only the Mission Control Center had this visibility
and would have to make a call to the crew.
Provides the capability to allow the Orbiter crew to select "normal" or
"alternate" body flap schedules and body bending filters through an item
entry. This will reduce the potential for SSME heating and expand the
contingency abort envelope.
Automatically transitions primary and secondary runway and TACAN
selection when transitioning from OPS #1 (ascent) to OPS #3 (entry)
during a Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) contingency. Currently,
the Orbiter crew must reselect the secondary runway and TACAN after
OPS #1 to OPS #3 transition. Failure to accomplish this transition
could result in the loss of vehicle and crew.
Provides for automatic External Tank (ET) umbilical door closure on
entry in OPS #6 (abort) during a TAL contingency. This change
eliminates the requirement for the Orbiter crew to manually close the
ET umbilical doors during a time-critical abort situation.
Adds low thrust-to-weight guidance constraint that allows the thrust
vector to be pointed vertical, but not retrograde. This allows
maximization of the vehicle's ability to climb out to a safe altitude.
Adds a parameter to improve Return-To-Launch-Site (RTLS)
monitoring by the Orbiter crew and to provide additional information
needed to determine if a downmode to a contingency procedure is
required.
Provides adaptive guidance enhancements to reduce engine-out
transients with Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) dispersions.
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Adds closed-loop Reaction Control System (RCS) pulse-mode to limit
duration/frequency of thruster firings to support Remote Manipulation
System (RMS)/payload operations.
Adds smart body flap to proportion control between elevons and body
flaps and eliminated need for the crew to interact with elevon
scheduling.
Provides desensitization of the Rotational-Hand Controller (RHC),
resulting in more vernier control during slapdown maneuver. Current
pitch RHC gain causes some overcontrol during the slapdown
maneuver.
Provides two-fault tolerance in OPS #1 (ascent) and OPS #6 (reentry)
for elevon feedback, speedbrake feedback, rudder feedback, RHC,
rudder pedal transducer assembly, and the Microwave Scanning Beam
Landing System (MSBLS).
Provides overlay capability in upper GPC memory for stowage and
quick retrieval of OPS #3 during OPS #2 (on-orbit) operations. This
capability eliminates the need to "freeze dry" OPS #3 in a GPC during
on-orbit operations.
Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) I_maiter Gasket Retainer Modification. Blow
holes in the igniter joint putty have been experienced on previous flights.
One of the effects observed has been erosion of cadmium plating on the
SRM igniter retainer gaskets. A redesign effort includes changing the gasket
retainer material from cadmium-plated steel to stainless steel. [See STS-35
Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report, Postflight Edition, March 15, 1991,
Section 4, SRM 3 for more details.]
Since the previous SRM set, cadmium plating has been eliminated on the
SRM igniter inner and outer gasket retainers [Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) SRM-2418]. This will eliminate the potential for cadmium-induced
embrittlement of the hardware. Removal of the cadmium does not affect
form, fit, or function. The corrosion preventative grease is the same as
currently used (reference TRW-60448, Certification Report for 4130 Steel
Gaskets). The new gaskets will be inspected using the existing inspection
criteria.
New Tire Pressure Transducer. STS-34/OV-104 is the first flight of the new
tire pressure transducer. This new transducer will allow the ground to more
accurately determine the tire pressure leak rate.
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Gaseous Oxygen (GOX) Fixed Orifice PressufiT_tion System, The STS-43
GOX Flow Control Valves (FCVs) are shimmed to a fixed 78% orifice. This
is the same configuration as STS-40, the first flight with fixed 78% GOX
FCV orifices. Fixed orifice pressurization performance on STS-40 was
excellent. Preflight predictions for STS-43 indicate that performance should
be similar to STS-40. A fixed 78% GOX orifice is expected to be the final
configuration for the Orbiter fleet.
Payload Return. Payload return will be permitted even though the vehicle
touchdown weight exceeds the 230,000-pound limit. The deorbit opportunity
will be waved off if prelanding analysis forecasts a violation of 1.85 g for all
heading alignment cones for all the runways at the landing site.
2.4 Payload Data
Atlantis will put NASA's fourth Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-E) into
orbit on Space Shuttle mission STS-43 to update the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System (TDRSS).
TDRS-E will be deployed from Atlantis about 6 hours after launch and will be
boosted to a geosynchronous orbit by an attached Inertial Upper Stage (IUS). TDRS-E
will be positioned to remain stationary 22,400 miles above the Pacific Ocean southwest
of Hawaii.
The TDRSS, in operation since the eighth Space Shuttle flight, provides almost
uninterrupted communications with Earth-orbiting shuttles and satellites and has
replaced the intermittent coverage provided by globe-encircling ground tracking stations
used during the early space program. The TDRSS will replace the NASA ground-based
network of tracking and communication stations located around the world.
Payload Bay:
TDRS-E will relay signals and data to and from the Shuttle Orbiter,
unmanned low-Earth orbiting spacecraft, and Earth-based users without
processing. TDRS-E is composed of three distinct modules: a spacecraft
module, a payload module and an antenna module. The spacecraft module
houses the subsystems that operate the satellite. The payload module is
composed of the electronic equipment required to provide communications
between the user spacecraft and the ground.
The antenna module is composed of seven antenna systems: two single
access, the multiple access array and space-to-ground link, S-band omni for
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satellite health and housekeeping,and commercial K-band and C-band
antennas. Single Access Antenna (SAA) deployment failure modes were
reviewed based on investigation of the Galileo high-gain antenna failure to
deploy hilly. TRW inspected both SAA deployment mechanisms on
TDRS-E; a spoke was found to be out-of-place. A procedure was then
generated and exercised on TDRS-F to assure that the spoke could be safely
repositioned; the SAA spoke was successfully repositioned and reinspected.
The Space to Ground Line (SGL) antenna drive was also reviewed based on
the Galileo investigation. Analyses were redone, using bounding conservative
assumptions based on stiffness tests, that indicated adequate torque margins
for the TDRS-E SGL antenna drive assembly.
IUS-15, the vehicle to be used on STS-43 to boost TDRS-E into a
geosynchronous orbit, is a two-stage rocket weighing approximately 32,500
pounds (lb). Each stage has a solid rocket motor. The IUS is 5.18 meters
(17 feet) long and 2.8 meters (9.25 feet) in diameter. It consists of an aft
skirt; an aft stage solid rocket motor containing 21,400 lb of propellant
generating approximately 42,000 lb of thrust; an interstage; a forward stage
solid rocket motor with 6,000 lb of propellant generating approximately
18,000 lb of thrust; and an Airborne Support Equipment (ASE). The
reaction control system controls the IUS/TDRS attitude during coasting; roll
control during SRM thrusting; and velocity impulses for accurate orbit
injection. IUS-15 will carry two reaction control fuel tanks, each containing
120 lb of hydrazine. The ASE is the mechanical, avionics, and structural
equipment located in the Orbiter that supports the IUS and the TDRS-E in
the Orbiter payload bay and elevates the IUS/TRDS for final checkout and
deployment from the Orbiter.
Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SSBUV) Experiment -- The SSBUV
payload is mounted in 2 Get-Away-Special (GAS) containers. This
experiment will check the calibration of the ozone measuring instruments
aboard the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-9
and NOAA-11 satellites and the NASA Nimbus-7 satellite to verify the
accuracy of the data set of atmospheric ozone and solar irradiance data. The
SSBUV measurements will be compared with nearly coincident
measurements taken by Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SBUV) instruments on
these satellites to help scientists solve the problem of data repeatability
caused by calibration drift of free-flying SBUV instruments.
Space Station Heat Pipe Advanced Radiator Element-II (SHARE-H) -- is a
modification of the SHARE-II payload that was flown on STS-29. SHARE-II
will demonstrate and quantify the microgravity thermal vacuum performance
of a high-capacity, space-constructible, heat pipe radiator element for heat
rejection as a prelude to development of a Space Station heat rejection
system. The two major components of SHARE-n are: the Heat Pipe
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Radiator System (HPRS) and the Heat Pipe Instrumentation and Control
System (HPICS). The HPRS consists of two 22-foot long heat pipes. The
pipes are divided into an evaporator section and a condenser section and are
filled with ammonia.
Optical Communication Through the Shuttle Window (OCTW) Flight
Demonstration -- is a demonstration system to test the feasibility of using
fiber optics to transmit data between the Orbiter crew cabin and the payload
bay through an aft Shuttle window. The system consists of a payload bay box
and a crew cabin box, each containing a video transmitter/receiver and a
digital transmitter/receiver, and two optical couplers. The couplers transmit
the fiber optic signal through the window. The video and digital link will be
simulated with test signals inside the cabin. The signals will be transmitted
via the fiber optic link to the payload bay. In the payload bay, the signals
will be received and retrammitted to the crew cabin where they will be
analyzed to determine system performance.
Tank Pressure Control Experiment (TPCE) -- is a study to determine the
effects of microgravity on the thermal stratification of fluids and to determine
the effectiveness of jet-induced mixing for controlling tank pressure. The
experiment is contained in GAS hardware, and the working fluid is
Freon 113.
Middeck:
Solid Surface Combustion Experiment (SSCE) --will measure flame spread
rate, solid-phase temperature, and gas-phase temperature for flames
spreading over a rectangular fuel bed in microgravity to research
improvements for fire safety in space travel.
BioServe Instrumentation Technology Associates (ITA) Materials Dispersion
Apparatus (BIMDA) -- consists of Materials Dispersion Apparatus (MDA)
minilabs and their controller and the Refrigerator/Incubator Module (R/IM)
carrier which houses the entire BIMDA hardware. The MDA is a compact
mixing device capable of mixing up to 100 samples of any 2 or 3 fluids using
the liquid-to-liquid diffusion process. The 4 MDA units are expected to yield
over 200 separate data points from experiments conducted in protein crystal
growth, zeolite crystal formation, collagen and virus assembly, interferon
induction, seed germination, cell fixation, and fluid sciences/diffusion
experiments. Another primary element of the BIMDA payload is the
bioprocessing testbed that will be used to mix cells with various activation
fluids followed by extended periods of metabolic activity and subsequent
sampling to determine the response of live cells to various hormones and
stimulating agents under mierogravity conditions.
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Two of the 4 BIMDA MDAs contain fluids which have a relative irritancy
rating: moderately high, high, or very high. These fluids were analyzed by a
JSC toxicologist. Contact of these fluids with the crewmembers eyes could
cause serious injury. This constitutes a catastrophic hazard. Three levels of
containment are required to control a potentially catastrophic hazard which
results from the release of toxic chemicals. The 2 MDAs containing these
fluids do not meet this requirement for triple containment; they have only 2
levels of containment. Review of this problem resulted in agreement that the
2 levels of containment provided will result in satisfactory safety for the crew.
A waiver of the triple containment requirement was approved by the Level II
Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) on July 12, 1991.
Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS) -- is used to record very
low-level accelerations in 3 axes, at up to 3 locations in the middeck, to
measure the amount of disturbance to the weightless environment onboard
throughout the flight and during specific events including orbital maneuvering
system and reaction control system firings.
Protein Crystal Growth III (PCG III) -- is a continuing series of experiments
leading toward major benefits in biomedical technology. The experiments on
this mission could improve pharmaceutical agents like insulin. The hardware
consists of the Protein Crystal Facility (PCF) and R/IM. The experiment will
demonstrate the techniques to produce large, high-quality insulin crystals by
batch process under controlled conditions. Growth of relatively large and
highly-ordered protein crystals reduces the time required to determine
protein molecular structures by x-ray diffraction and computer modeling.
Investigation into Polymer Membranes Processing (IPMP) --will investigate
the physical and chemical processes that occur during the formation of
polymer membranes in microgravity to improve the knowledge base that can
be applied to commercial membrane processing techniques. This mission will
provide additional data on the polymer precipitation process. Sample
materials are polysulfone, N-N-dimethylacetamide, and acetone. Following
the flight, samples will be tested, and quantitative evaluation consisting of
comparisons of the membranes' permeability and selectivity characteristics
with those of laboratory-produced membranes will be performed.
Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) -- is an electro-optical facility that
tracks the Orbiter and records signatures from thruster firings, water dumps,
or the phenomena of Shuttle glow (caused by the interaction of atomic
oxygen with the spacecraft). The data is used to calibrate the infrared and
optical sensors at the facility. No hardware onboard the Shuttle is needed for
the system.
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Auroral Photography Experiment-B (APE-B) -- is designed to study the
geographic extent and dynamics of the aurora (the Northern and Southern
lights) by photographing the airglow aurora, auroral optical effects, Shuttle
glow phenomenon, and thruster emissions.
Ultraviolet Plume Instrument (UVPI) -- The Orbiter will be used as a
calibration target for space-based ultraviolet sensors. Imagery and/or
signature data of the Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) and
Reaction Control System (RCS) burns during orbital trajectory intersection
will be obtained using an instnnnent on the Low-Power Atmospheric
Compensation Experiment (LACE) and an on-orbit Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization (SDIO) satellite. No flight hardware is involved.
Lower Body Negative Pressure Experiment --The safety community has
identified a concern with possible adverse effects during the conduct of the
test on-orbit. Further coordination between medical, flight crew, and safety
has been completed; test criteria have been agreed upon.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-43 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-43 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were repeated or related
to anomalies that occurred during the STS-43 flight (see Section 7). The list indicates the
section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the ffem is addressed, the
item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description of the item, and brief
comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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Section 6:
Orbiter 2
ITEM
STS-37 Infli__ht Anomalies
Water Spray Boiler
(WSB) #2 did not cool
Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) lube oil while under
operation of controller "A".
COMMENT
On the STS-37 flight, WSB #2 failed to
cool APU #2 lube oil after the end of
the pool boiling period during ascent.
WSB #2 was under the operation of
controller "A". The crew was directed to
switch to controller 'W' when lube oil
temperature reached 280" Fahrenheit
(F); nominal cooling begins at 250"F.
Lube oil temperatures had begun to drop
just prior to the crew action. The same
anomaly occurred during STS-38, the
previous flight of OV-104. The most
probable cause of this problem was
freezing of the spray bar due to wax
buildup in the WSB.
During STS-43 ascent, WSB #2, Serial
Number (S/N)018, gave no indication
that it was cooling lube oil from APU #2,
S/N 208 (IFA No. STS-43-V-02). Lube
oil return temperature and gear box
forward bearing temperature exceeded
the specification limits; APU #2 was shut
down directly after MECO.
During STS-43 on-orbit flight control
checkout, WSB #2/APU #2 were
operated for 11 minutes. Again, no lube
oil cooling was observed. WSB #2
cooling was confirmed failed, and the
decision was made to invoke the flight
rule allowing late turn-on of APU #2 [at
Terminal Area Energy Management
(TAEM)]. Lube oil temperature again
ran high until APU #2 was shut down at
wheel stop. (See Section 7, Orbiter 1, for
more details.)
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ITEM COMMENT
Section 6:
Orbiter 3
STS-37 Inflight Anomalies
Power Reactant Supply and
Distribution (PRSD)
Oxygen (02) manifold valve
#2 failed to close when
commanded.
On the STS-37 flight, the PRSD 0 2
manifold valve #2 failed to close when
commanded the first 2 times on orbit.
The valve, S/N 28, finally closed on the
third command and was left closed for
the remainder of the STS-37 mission. 02
manifold valve #2 is 1 of 2 redundant
valves used to isolate the manifold or
PRSD supply tank from a system leak.
Failure of both manifold valves to close
would result in depletion of fuel cell 02
reactants and potential loss of the 3 fuel
cell power plants.
No PRSD 0 2 manifold valve anomalies
were reported on STS-43/OV-104.
However, PRSD Hydrogen (H2)
manifold # 1 isolation valve failed to close
when commanded on STS-43 flight
day #7 (IFA No. STS-43-V-09); this H 2
isolation valve was the same model as the
0 2 isolation valve that failed on STS-37.
This manifold valve anomaly on STS-43
could not be repeated during STS-43
postflight troubleshooting at KSC. The
valve command circuit will be
instrumented for the next flight of
OV-104.
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-43 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that are considered
resolved for STS-43. These items have been reviewed by the NASA Safety Community.
A description of the risk factor, information regarding problem resolution, and rationale
for flight are provided for each safety risk factor. The safety position with respect to
resolution is based on findings resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP),
Prelaunch Assessment Review (PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) evaluations (or other special panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety
assessment arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts conducted, and
tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve each specific problem.
Hazard Reports (HRs) associated with each risk factor in this section are listed
beneath the risk factor title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the risk
factor, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
The following risk factors in this section represent a low-to-moderate increase in
risk above the Level I approved Hazard Baseline. The NASA Safety Community
assessed the relative risk increase of each and determined that the associated increase
was acceptable.
Integration 2 Kennedy Space Center Shuttle landing.
Orbiter 5 Main Propulsion System cryogenic temperature transducer
failure.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-43 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
INTEGRATION
1 Backup Flight Software can hang in a "wait" state failure mode.
2 Kennedy Space Center Shuttle landing.
4-4
4-5
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
External Tank umbilical door lug clevis cracks on STS-37/OV-104.
Potential for new General Purpose Computers to erroneously
overwrite memory.
Debris found in STS-37/OV-104 window #1.
OV-105 T-handle access door for the emergency egress window
jettison opened during ferry flight.
Main Propulsion System cryogenic temperature transducer failure.
Main Propulsion System Helium tank leak.
STS-43/OV-104 Return-To-Launch-Site landing weight.
STS-43/OV-104 Engine Interface Unit Power-On Reset anomaly.
Generic power supply problem in the new General Purpose
Computers, AP-101S.
AP-101S General Purpose Computer sleep mode anomaly.
Right outboard elevon noise.
Avionics software discrepancy provides the potential for an
undetected failure of a Space Shuttle Main Engine controUer
channel.
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer, Flight Aft-3 power supply Built-in Test
Equipment anomaly on STS-43/OV-104.
Contamination found in OV-103 Main Propulsion System.
4-12
4-13
4-13
4-14
4-17
4-22
4-26
4-27
4-29
4-31
4-33
4-34
4-37
4-38
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ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-43 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
SSME
2
3
4
5
6
7
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump main housing contamination
during fabrication.
Undetected cold wall coolant tube leaks.
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump #2222 turbine stator vane crack.
Main Combustion Chamber debond.
Helium precharge valve vent line contamination.
Antiflood Valve seal leak.
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump thrust ball cracks.
4-40
4-42
4-43
4-45
4-46
4-47
4-50
SRB
1
2
SRM
1
IUS
1
2
Solid Rocket Booster hydraulic power unit fuel filter issue.
Right-Hand Solid Rocket Booster forward Booster Separation Motor
failed Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller resistance test.
Potential for higher than normal erosion and charring in the STS-43
Solid Rocket Motor aft exit cone.
Tin whisker problem on Leach relays.
Failed solder joints in the Redundant Inertial Measurement Unit.
4-52
4-55
4-56
4-58
4-59
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SECTION 5
STS-40 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-40/OV-102 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly
described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Reports (HRs) associated with each risk factor in this section are listed
beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the anomaly,
or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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SECTION 5 INDEX
STS-40 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
QRBITER
1
2
3
4
5
Inertial Measurement Unit #2, Serial Number 023, failed preflight
calibration.
1307 bulkhead environmental seal and thermal blanket anomalies.
Heat erosion of STS-40/OV-102 Right-Hand External Tank umbilical
door centerline latch.
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 fuel test line temperature above Fault
Detection and Annunciation alarm limits.
Cylindrical object debris seen at External Tank separation.
5-3
5-4
5-8
5-10
5-11
4
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SECTION 6
STS-37 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-37/OV-104 mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle. Each anomaly is
briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Reports (HRs) associated with each risk factor in this section are listed
beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the anomaly,
or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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SECTION 6 INDEX
STS-37 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
QRBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
Reaction Control System primary thruster RIU failed off during
External Tank separation maneuver.
Water Spray Boiler #2 did not cool Auxiliary Power Unit lube oil
while under operation of controller "A".
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Oxygen manifold valve #2
failed to dose when commanded.
Indications of low Chamber Pressure on primary thrusters L1U and
L1L during interconnect operations.
Backup Flight Software navigation initialization anomaly.
Water Spray Boiler #3 overcool during entry.
6-3
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6-8
6-9
6-11
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SECTION 7
STS-43 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (WAs) arising from the
STS-43/OV-104 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Reports (HRs) associated with each risk factor in this section are listed
beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the anomaly,
or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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SECTION 7 INDEX
STS-43 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO. ANOMALY PAGE
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
No cooling on Water Spray Boiler #2 on ascent. 7-3
Power Reactant Supply and D/stribution Hydrogen tank #1, heater 7-4
"B" failed off.
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Hydrogen manifold # 1 7-5
isolation valve failed open.
Auxiliary Power Unit #1, Serial Number 305, anomalous Gas 7-6
Generator chamber pressure during entry.
Main Propulsion System Liquid Hydrogen 4-/rich disconnect portion of 7-7
seal stuck in flapper.
Right-hand outboard brake pressure bias. 7-11
STS.43/OV-104 Main Propulsion System Liquid Oxygen bleed/check 7-12
valve failure.
SSME
Space Shuttle Main Engine #3 controller Digital Computer Unit
failure on channel "A".
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7-2 STS-43 Postflight Edition
(n
uJ
m
..I
<
=S
0
Z
.<
-r"
..I
IJ.
Z
mm
(o
I"
(n
l-
u)
UJUj
O.j
O<
<Z
<
0
Z
<
mZ
0
144
m
==I
_E
O
Z
I-.
-I-(_
_J
IJ.
Z
I--.
C/)
Z
.,=,
J
8
_E
0
Z
zo
,,,d
-JW
W_
e_
o
o
Z
o_
°_ _
ii.°o
I-
_o
o
0
Z
1.1.1Z
..IW
J_
-=._
_°_
_ o
o
.wN
o
(n
=am
-I
:S
0
Z
<
I--.
3:
(.0
mini
-I
IJ=
Z
U)
(n
l_lul
O.j
O<
<;¢
1
8
>,
<
0
Z
<.
ul Z
m_
•=_=_ _=_ ° .___ _=_-_
'_ _ "0"0 0 _ _"_
_='a'_ "_" -. =;::) _.;':,_
_..._=_. __ _o_
1_=
z_ _,
"=oe _ =
o
°_,_
.,N
'o
o
r--
i¢/)
I--
0,.
U.I I.IJ
_..J
=o
=E
0
Z
u.Iz
1.1.1_
;I
0
=51 _- =
.9
0
e_
rZ
(n
LIJ
m
..J
.<
:E
0
Z
<
I-
2:
t3
m
..I
I.I.
Z
t/)
I-
U)
a.
O<
<;[
<
0
Z
<
u,Iz
o
t_.
.=:1¢::
r_
o
=::
o
°_.,_
°_,_
,.t=
°.m
¢::
¢,#3
o
r,/3
t"--
(n
u.i
m
..I
,<
:S
0
Z
,<
I--
"r"
mmm
.J
Z
U)
I-
U)
a.
u.I i,u(1_,
(.1<
<Z
<
0
z
<
_d
-1 Z
.J
-lffl
o
c:
o
o
"o
o
.o
"o
°_,.¢
r_3
o
U3
o,,
r--
u)
p-(n
z
a.
(.1<
<z
1
8
<
IE
0
Z
<
zO
IIIZ
0
l:
o
o,m
8 .
4..=
_3
il°
0
Y=
C_
F.
°_.,_
o
"I"
[/3
o•
(n
i-..
(n
o.
Wuj(3-
o<
.<;[
<
0
Z
<
_6
t- Z
..o
°,,,_
.J=
°,m
0
er_
"I"
(n
ILl
imm
,.J
<
:S
0
;[
<
!-..
"r
m
.-I
u.
Z
(n
i-.
(n
z
<[
:S
0
z
<
uJz
_,.8
_ ,,-1 • o
_m_ Z
°_
°,,,_
°,,m
_z
b
w
m
.¢
0
Z
.¢
I..-
"I"
m
--I
I.I.
Z
I-
Q.
U.Iuj
O.j
,z
8
>,
,¢
0
Z
,¢
d
UJZ
_d
._U.l
U.If._
be
o-_
Z Z
0
o_
,1=
i:m
o
e_
_Z
_w
8
I
0
Z
_d
mz
W_
,_, o_
•_'_ _ _
_-_._ _,_,
_._-_ _ __
._:_ | _ o._o-'oo
c_
L.
o_
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AFV
AMOS
AOA
APE
APU
AR
ARC
ASE
ATO
ATP
BFS
BIMDA
BITE
BSM
Btu
C
CAR
CEI
CG
CPU
DAR
DC
DCU
DR
DTO
EAFB
ECLSS
ECP
EDM
EDT
Antiflood Valve
Air Force Maui Optical Site
Abort-Once-Around
Auroral Photography Experiment
Attxiliary Power Unit
Accepted Risk
Ames Research Center
Airborne Support Equipment
Abort-To-Orbit
Acceptance Test Procedure
Backup Hight Software
Bioserve Instrumentation Technology Associates Materials Dispersion
Apparatus
Built-In Test Equipment
Booster Separation Motor
British Thermal Unit
Controlled
Corrective Action Request
Configuration End Item
Center of Gravity
Central Processing Unit
Deviation Approval Request
Direct Current
Digital Computer Unit
Discrepancy Report
Detailed Test Objective
Eowards Air Force Base
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Engineering Change Proposal
Electrical Discharge Machining
Eastern Daylight Time
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
EI
EIU
EOM
ET
EVA
F
FA
FASCOS
FCOD
FCS
FCV
FD
FDA
FID
FIV
FMEA
FMEA/CIL
FR
FRR
FRSI
FSD
ft
ft-lb
ft/sec
g
GAS
GG
GOX
GPC
HCF
He
HPFTP
HPICS
HPOTP
HPRS .
HPU
Entry Interface
Engine Interface Unit
End-Of-Mission
External Tank
Extravehicular Activity
Fahrenheit
Flight Aft
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Flight Crew Operations Directorate
Flight Control System
Flow Control Valve
Flight Day
Fault Detection and Annunciation
Failure Identification
Fuel Isolation Valve
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Flight Rule
Flight Readiness Review
Felt Reusable Surface Insulation
Full-Scale Development
Feet
Foot-Pounds
Feet Per Second
Gravitational Acceleration
Get-Away-Special
Gas Generator
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
Hydrogen
High-Cycle Fatigue
Helium
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Heat Pipe Instrumentation and Control System
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Heat Pipe Radiator System
Hydraulic Power Unit
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LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
HPV
HR
I/O
IBM
lEA
IFA
II_J
INTG
l_D
_M_
ISL
rl"A
rl.JS
JAEL
JSC
kg-m
KSC
LACE
LaRC
lb
Ibm
LCC
LH
LH2
LO 2
LOX
LPFTP
LPOTP
LRU
LSFR
L-2
M&P
MCC
MCF
MDA
Helium Precharge Valve
Hazard Report
Input/Output
International Business Machines
Integrated Electronic Assembly
InflightAnomaly
Inertial Measurement Unit
Integration
Initial Program Load
Investigation into Polymer Membranes Processing
Inertial Systems Laboratory
Instrumentation Technology Associates
Inertial Upper Stage
Johnson Space Center Avionics Engineering Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
Kilogram-Meter
Kennedy Space Center
Low-Power Atmospheric Compensation Experiment
Langley Research Center
Pound
Pounds-Mass
Launch Commit Criteria
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Line Replaceable Unit
Launch Site Flow Review
Launch Minus 2 Day
Materials and Processing
Main Combustion Chamber
Major Component Failure
Materials Dispersion Apparatus
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LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
MDF
MDM
ME
MEC
MECO
rain
MLG
MM602
MOD
MPS
MR
ms
MSBLS
MSE
MSFC
Y 2
N2_
NASA
NM
NOAA
NSI
NSRS
NWS
02
OCTW
OMI
OMRSD
OMS
OPF
OPS
ORBI
OSMQ
OV
P/N
PAR
PASS
Pc
Minimum Duration Flight
Mulfiplexer-Demultiplexer
Main Engine
Main Engine Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
Minute
Main Landing Gear
Major Mode 602
Mission Operations Directorate
Main Propulsion System
Material Review
Millisecond
Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
Mission Safety Evaluation
Marshall Space Flight Center
Nitrogen
Nitrogen Tetroxide
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nautical Mile
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NASA Standard Initiator
NASA Safety Reporting System
Nose Wheel Steering
Oxygen
Optical Communication Through the Shuttle Window
Operations and Maintenance Instructions
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Orbiter Processing Facility
Operations Sequence
Orbiter
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Orbiter Vehicle
Part Number
Prelaunch Assessment Review
Primary Avionics Software System
Chamber Pressure
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LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
PCF
PCG
PCV
PDU
PFS
PIC
PLB
PLBD
POR
PR
PRCB
PRSD
psi
psia
psig
PSIG
PSU
R/IM
RCS
RH
RHC
RIMU
RM
RMS
RPC
RSRM
RTLS
RTV
S/N
SAA
SAIL
SAMS
SBUV
SCCS
scfm
scim
SDIO
sec
Protein Crystal Facility
Protein Crystal Growth
Pulse Control Valve
Power Distribution Unit
Primary Flight System
Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller
Payload Bay
Payload Bay Door
Power-On Reset
Problem Report
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Propulsion Systems Integration Group
Pyro Switching Unit
Refrigerator/Incubator Module
Reaction Control System
Right-Hand
Rotational-Hand Controller
Redundant Inertial Measurement Unit
Redundancy Management
Remote Manipulation System
Remote Power Controller
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Return-To-Launch-Site
Room-Temperature Vulcanizing
Serial Number
Single Access Antenna
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
Space Acceleration Measurement System
Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second
Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute
Standard Cubic Inches Per Minute
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
Second
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LIST OF ACRONYMS . CONTINUED
SEM
SGL
SHARE
SLF
SMS
SOV
SRB
SRM
SSBUV
SSCE
SSME
SSRP
TAEM
TAL
TDRS
TDRSS
TIG
TPCE
TPS
TVC
USBI
UVPI
VDT
WPAFB
WSB
WSTF
Scanning Electron Microscope
Space to Ground Line
Space Station Heat Pipe Advanced Radiator Element
Shuttle Landing Facility
Shuttle Mission Simulator
Shutoff Valve
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet Experiment
Solid Surface Combustion Experiment
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Terminal Area Energy Management
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Time of Ignition
Tank Pressure Control Experiment
Thermal Protection System
Thrust Vector Control
United Space Boosters, Inc.
Ultraviolet Plume Instrument
Vehicle Data Table
Wright Patterson Air Force Base
Water Spray Boiler
White Sands Test Facility
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